SURPRISING ORIGINALISM:
THE REGULA LECTURE *
Lawrence B. Solum**
I. INTRODUCTION: PRECONCEPTIONS ABOUT ORIGINALISM
My impression is that most Americans believe that they already
know everything they need to know about constitutional originalism.
Originalism is based on two ideas: (1) the meaning of the constitutional
text was fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified; and (2)
courts and officials should be bound by that fixed meaning. 1 These ideas
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** Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I owe thanks to the
participants at the Regula Lecture for their questions and comments and to Randy Barnett and Michael
Dorf for comments on prior drafts.
1. This Article is part of a larger project that is in progress. The treatment here is informal
and brief. The larger project is longer, formal, and more theoretical. See Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public Meaning Approach, CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming
2018); Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the
Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621 (2018); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist
Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269 (2017); Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Original
Meaning of the Constitutional Text, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015); Lawrence B. Solum,
Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2015); Lawrence B. Solum,
Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 480 (2013); Lawrence B.
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013); Lawrence B.
Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479 (2013); Lawrence
B. Solum, Construction and Constraint, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEG. STUD. 17, 22 (2013); Lawrence B.
Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const. Comment. 95 (2011); Lawrence B.
Solum, What Is Originalism? in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (Grant Huscroft and Bradley W. Miller eds., Cambridge University Press, 2011);
Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 440
(2009); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
923-981 (2009). In addition to the published and forthcoming articles, works in progress include
Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis (unpublished work-in-progress, August 20, 2105);
Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice
(unpublished
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March
24,
2017),
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papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215. The earliest version of the project was developed in a work that is
still in progress, Semantic Originalism, November 22, 2008, https://papers.ssrn.com/
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are simple but many Americans may be surprised to learn what
originalists today actually think about many topics, including the nature
of original meaning, the implications of originalism for a variety of issues,
and the justifications for originalism. Even sophisticated lawyers may be
surprised by the reality of contemporary originalism. Today’s “public
meaning originalism” is not yesterday’s “doctrine of original intent.”
Although Americans revere the Constitution, 2 they disagree about
originalism. 3 Conservatives and libertarians are sure that originalism is a
necessary corrective to the liberal excesses of the Warren Court.4
Progressives have an almost unshakeable belief that originalism is a rightwing ideology that seeks to legitimize conservative outcomes by invoking
the prestige of the Founding Fathers. 5 One distinguished legal scholar has
gone so far as to suggest that using the word “originalism” to describe a
theory that does not invariably lead to conservative outcomes is
Orwellian. 6 On both the left and the right, minds are made up, because
most of us are pretty sure that there is nothing surprising to be learned
about originalism.
My aim in this year’s Regula Lecture is to provide some food for
thought. Contemporary originalist constitutional theory and practice turn
out to be surprising—in fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that
originalism is very surprising indeed. Unless you have been following
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244.
2. Preston D. Hutson, The Oxford Handbook of the U.S. Constitution Edited by Mark Tushnet,
Mark A. Graber and Sanford Levinson, Oxford University Press, 2015, HOUS. LAW., March/April
2016, at 42 (“Americans revere the Constitution as a sacred text justifying their continued belief in
a Constitutional faith.”).
3. See generally Neal Devins and Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and State Supreme Courts,
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 456-57 (2010); Ryan D. Walters, Fragmenting the Judiciary: Shifting
Implementation of Supreme Court Doctrine from Federal Courts to State Courts, 42 CAP. U. L. REV.
951, 952 (2014).
4. Peter J. Smith, Originalism and Level of Generality, 51 GA. L. REV. 485, 556 (2017) (“The
old originalism was primarily a response to the perceived excesses of the Warren Court.”);
JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 66-67, 92-110 (2005); John Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in
Supreme Court and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 YALE L.J. 484, 514 (2014) (“Textualism and
originalism developed in part in response to discomfort with the perceived excesses of the Warren
Court.”).
5. See Calvin TerBeek, Originalism’s Obituary, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 29, 33–5 (2015); Robert
Post and Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 549 & 567 (2006); Sheldon D. Pollack, Constitutional Interpretation as
Political Choice, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 989, 1003 (1987); James E. Fleming, The New Originalist
Manifesto, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 539, 544 (2012); see also Keith E. Whittington, Is Originalism Too
Conservative?,34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 38 (2011)).
6. Martin H. Redish and Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation,
and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485,
1509 (2012).
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constitutional jurisprudence very closely, it is likely that much of what
you believe about originalism is inaccurate, incomplete, or just plain
wrong.
This article takes the reader on a guided tour of contemporary
originalism. Along the way, I will engage in speculation about the original
meaning of various constitutional provisions. Let me be crystal clear: this
Article does not reach conclusions about the original meaning of any
particular constitutional provision. Reaching firm conclusions requires
meticulous research and analysis that I have not undertaken and that could
only be presented in an extensive treatment—a long article on each topic.
Rather, I am presenting my tentative views, informed by long experience
with originalism and a deep familiarity with the constitutional text, but
not by rigorous application of the best originalist methodology. 7 I am
prepared to be surprised once the research has been done. Indeed, that is
the whole point: originalism as it is practiced today does not fit our
preconceptions. Originalism can and does surprise us—once we know
what originalism really is.
This Article discusses three ways in which originalism is surprising:
Surprising theory is the topic of Part I. 8 Surprising implications are
explored in Part II. 9 Surprising justifications are the subject of Part III. 10
The Conclusion reflects on the implications of surprising originalism.
II. A SURPRISING THEORY
The word “originalism” was first introduced into the vocabulary of
American constitutional theory in 1981 by law professor Paul Brest. 11 But
the core originalist ideas predated Brest’s neologism. 12 From the very
beginning, American constitutional jurisprudence has recognized that the
meaning of the constitutional text does not change; the ideas 13
7. See Solum, Originalist Methodology, supra note 1.
8. See infra Part I, p. 4.
9. See infra Part II, p. 20.
10. See infra Part III, p. 42.
11. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204
(1980).
12. Brest wrote after critics of the Warren Court and “living constitutionalism” were beginning
to flesh out the ideas that later gelled into contemporary originalist constitutional theory. This early
stage of originalist theorizing has been called “Proto-Originalism.” We can call these early versions
of originalism “Proto-Originalism.” See Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra
note 1, at 462–63.
13. The word “ideas” has philosophical connotations that I do not intend to convey here. The
word “content” would be more precise, but that word may sound odd to readers who are not familiar
with contemporary philosophy of language or theoretical linguistics. The content of a text or oral
communication is the set of concepts and propositions conveyed. Thus, the public “communicative
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communicated by the text are fixed at the time each provision of the
constitution is set down on paper. 14 Further, the fixed meaning of the
constitutional text is not mere advice: it is binding! Judges do not have the
power to promulgate “stealth amendments” to the Constitution in the
guise of “interpretation.” 15 The constitution should constrain judges—it is
not a blank check. Nothing about these ideas should be surprising: I
believe it is quite likely that most of the bar and bench would agree with
the core originalist ideas of fixation and constraint, although things might
be different in the rarefied atmosphere of the ivory tower and the august
chambers of the highest courts.
A.

The Wrong Question: What Would James Madison Do?

Many Americans who agree with the core originalist ideas of fixation
and constraint disagree with “originalism” as they understand the word.
Somewhere along the way, the perception of originalism by the bar and
bench, the general public, and even most law professors became distorted.
In part this is because some of the early critiques of the Warren Court
emphasized what are called “the original intentions of the framers.” 16 The
early reaction to originalism in the academy was swift: the whole idea of
“original intent” makes no sense 17—and even if it did make sense, we
wouldn’t want to ground our constitutional jurisprudence on the thoughts
of white property-owning males who lived in a world that is very different
than our own. 18
content” of the constitutional text is the set of propositions conveyed to the public by the text at the
time each provision was framed and ratified.
14. This idea is the Fixation Thesis. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The
Original Meaning of the Constitutional Text, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015). Michael Dorf argues
that fidelity to the constitution does not require adherence to the fixed original meaning of the
constitutional text but could instead be fidelity to the contemporary meaning of the text. Despite this
distinguished company. Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2040–
44 (2012). This argument does not deny the Fixation Thesis, but it does challenge the constraint
principle. See infra note 15.
15. This idea is the Constraint Principle. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle:
Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice (unpublished manuscript, March 24, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215.
16. These early forms of originalism could be called “Proto-Originalism.” See Solum,
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 1, at 462.
17. In addition to Brest, supra note 11, there were many other prominent critics of the
intentionalist approach. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 470
(1981).
18. R. George Wright, Originalism and the Problem of Fundamental Fairness, 91 MARQ. L.
REV. 687, 693 (2008); Philip C. Kissam, Explaining Constitutional Law Publicly, Or, Everyman’s
Constitution, 71 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 77, 89 (2002); Harold Anthony Lloyd, “Original” Means Old,
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Indeed, the notion of the original intentions of the framers has been
parodied by equating originalism with the question, “What would James
Madison do?” 19 However, that is not the question that contemporary
originalists ask. More than thirty years ago, the mainstream of originalist
constitutional theory turned away from intentionalism and toward
textualism. One of the most important events in this turn was a talk given
by Justice Scalia, in which he urged originalists to “change the label from
the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning.” 20
Indeed, almost all of the actual development of originalism after the
publication of Brest’s critique has assumed that we should not be asking
what James Madison would do, or what he would have thought about
contemporary problems, or what the members of the Philadelphia
Convention believed about the purposes, goals, or expected applications
of the Constitution that they proposed for ratification. By the 1990s, it was
clear that there was a “New Originalism” that was concerned with the
original public meaning of the constitutional text. This new originalism
was first elaborated by Professor Gary Lawson, 21 followed by many
others including, Professors Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash. 22
Where did the idea that originalists want to know what would James
Madison do come from? One source may be the early prominence of
Raoul Berger, whose book Government by Judiciary, included a chapter
entitled “Why the Original Intention?.” 23 Berger was characterized by
Paul Brest as a “strict intentionalist” and originalist in 1981, the same year
that Brest coined the word “originalism.” 24 Attorney General Edwin
Meese promoted the doctrine of original intent in a series of prominent
speeches. 25
“Original” Means New: An “Original” Look at What “Originalists” Do, 67 NAT’L LAW. GUILD
REV. 135, 149 (2010).
19. See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor:
Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1181,
1190 (2017); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375,
382 (2013); Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 385, 396
(2009); Carl T. Rowan, Equality As A Constitutional Concept, 47 MD. L. REV. 10, 12 (1987).
20. Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties
in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 101
at 106 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice ed., 1987).
21. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 875 (1992).
22. See Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 553 (1994).
23. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, ch. 21 (rev. ed. 1997).
24. Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1089 (1981). The first use of the word is
in Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 11.
25. See Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985),
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Moreover, the idea of “original intentions” has never entirely
disappeared. Following Brest’s critique, intentionalism was defended by
Richard Kay 26 and there is now a “new intentionalism” that is based on
some very sophisticated work in the philosophy of language. The new
intentionalism is based on the idea that the drafter of a constitutional
provision has a “communicative intention”—the meaning the drafter of
each constitutional provision intended to convey to readers. 27
This new version of intentionalism avoids many of the problems of
the old version: it does not require that we identify the concrete policy
preferences of the framers. One of the new intentionalism’s chief virtues
is that it almost always converges with public meaning originalism. 28 The
drafters were writing for the public. The constitutional text was drafted to
be read by “We the People.” This idea was eloquently expressed by the
great Supreme Court Justice, Joseph Story, in his magisterial
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States:
In the first place, then, every word employed in the constitution is to be
expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context
furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions
are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of
expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for
the exercise of philosophical acuteness, or judicial research. They are
instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business of
human life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and

reprinted in The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution (Paul G. Cassell ed., 1986); see
also Edwin Meese III, The Case for Originalism, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, June 6, 2005,
https://www.heritage.org/commentary/the-case-originalism
[https://www.heritage.org/commentary/the-case-originalism]; Lynette Clemetson, Meese’s Influence
TIMES,
Apr.
17,
2005,
Looms
in
Today’s
Judicial
Wars,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/17/politics/meeses-influence-looms-in-todays-judicial-wars.html
[https://perma.cc/23M5-B2E9].
26. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).
27. To be more precise, the new intentionalism is the view that the original meaning of the
constitutional text is the meaning that the drafters intended to convey to their intended readers via the
reader’s recognition of the drafters’ communicative intentions. This idea is based on the work of Paul
Grice. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 3–143 (1989). For a Gricean approach to
original intentions originalism, see Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism in THE CHALLENGE
OF ORIGINALISM 87 (Grant Huscroft and Bradley W. Miller eds. 2011); see also John F. Manning,
What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 72 n.7 (2006); Jeffrey
Goldsworthy, Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal Positivism, 42 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 493, 510 n.57 (2005).
28. Because the constitution was drafted for “We the People,” the meaning that the authors of
the constitutional text intended to convey to the public (the intended readers) will be the public
meaning in the absence of some kind of linguistic mistake. For this reason, the new intentionalism
converges with public meaning originalism in almost all cases.
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fitted for common understandings. The people make them; the people
adopt them; the people must be supposed to read them, with the help of
common sense; and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite
meaning, or any extraordinary gloss. 29

Because the drafters of the constitutional text wrote for the public, the
meaning that they intended to convey was the public meaning—the
original public meaning of the constitutional text.
The now old-fashioned doctrine of original intent played an
important role in the early history of originalism. That is why the mistaken
belief that originalism is about the original intent of the framers is
understandable—even if it is about 30 years out of date.
B.

The Right Question: What Is the Public Meaning of the
Constitutional Text?

“What would Madison do?” is the wrong question. Here is the right
question: “What was the public meaning of the constitutional text?” This
is public meaning originalism.
In “What was the public meaning?”—the “was” is important. Words
change meaning over time: this is the well-known phenomenon of
linguistic drift or semantic shift. 30 The word “satellite” originally meant
“bodyguard” but Johannes Kepler used “satellite” metaphorically to
describe the moons of Jupiter and Jules Verne borrowed the metaphor to
apply it to a fictional man-made device orbiting the Earth. Verne’s usage
was borrowed to apply to Sputnik. 31 And now the primary meaning of
satellite is “a manufactured object or vehicle intended to orbit the earth,
the moon, or another celestial body” and the original sense of bodyguard
is no longer in use. 32 English is like a living organism; it grows and
changes.
What does linguistic drift have to do with the constitution? Consider
the phrase “domestic violence,” which appears in Article IV of the
Constitution: “The United States shall guarantee to every state in this

29. JOSEPH L. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §451
(1833); see also State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 398 (1920) (stating, “in the exposition
of statutes and constitutions, every word ‘is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense,
unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify or enlarge it,’ and there cannot be
imposed upon the words ‘any recondite meaning or any extraordinary gloss.’”) (citing Story).
30. See SOL STEINMETZ, SEMANTIC ANTICS: HOW AND WHY WORDS CHANGE MEANING 49–
50 (Random House 2008).
31. See id. at 200.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/satellite
32. MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
[perma.cc/S5PM-8GCH] (last visited May 21, 2018).
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union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them
against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive
(when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.” 33
Today the phrase “domestic violence” refers to “‘intimate partner abuse,’
‘battering,’ or ‘wife-beating,’” and it is understood to be “physical, sexual,
psychological, and economic abuse that takes place in the context of an
intimate relationship, including marriage.” 34
But this twenty-first century meaning of “domestic violence” was
unknown in the late eighteenth century when Article IV was drafted. It
would simply be a linguistic mistake to interpret the domestic violence
clause of Article IV of the Constitution of 1789 as referring to spouse or
child abuse. The anachronistic reading of “domestic violence” would be
mistaken because meaning (or more technically semantic content) is fixed
at the time when a text is written.35 When we interpret the constitutional
text, we seek the original meaning and not some new meaning that is a
product of a linguistic accident.
In the case of “domestic violence,” hardly anyone is tempted to
substitute the contemporary meaning for the original meaning—although
a whole law review article has been written that tries to do just that.36 Why
not? Because the surrounding context of Article IV plus a bit of
knowledge about the historical circumstances in which the constitution
was drafted are sufficient to steer us to the original meaning. We can then
intuitively grasp that the original meaning is the correct meaning of the
constitutional text. When a law professor tries to tell us that “domestic
violence” could mean “violence in the family,” we rebel! We know that
the phrase “domestic violence” occurring in close proximity to the word
“invasion” in an eighteenth-century document dealing with the basic
structure of government and the relationship of the states to each other

33. U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, Cl. 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every state in this
union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on
application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic violence.”)
34. Glossary, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/nepal0903/3.htm
[https://perma.cc/G9BP-FKPW] (visited March 29, 2008); see Emily J. Sack, The Domestic Relations
Exception, Domestic Violence, and Equal Access to Federal Courts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441
(2006).
35. Jack Balkin introduced me to this example. See Lawrence B. Solum, Blogging from APSA:
The New Originalism, Legal Theory Blog (Sept. 3, 2007), http://lsolum.typepad.com/
legaltheory/2007/09/blogging-from-a.html [https://perma.cc/6CHC-JPEF](live blogging at the
meeting of the American Political Science Association and describing Balkin’s presentation); JACK
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 37 (2011).
36. Mark S. Stein, The Domestic Violence Clause in “New Originalist” Theory, 37 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 129 (2009).
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and to the national government refers to things like “riots” and
“rebellions” within the boundaries of a state. Our intuitive reaction to
clever arguments that Article Four referred to spousal abuse is that these
verbal gymnastics are a form of sophistry. 37
No one is much surprised by the news that “domestic violence” in
Article IV does not mean “spousal abuse,” but here is an example that
may surprise you. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution uses the
word “dollar”:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law. 38

Contemporary readers are likely to assume that the word “dollar”
refers to the Federal Reserve Notes. They look like this:

A law student note has been written about the Seventh Amendment’s
“twenty-dollar clause”—based on the assumption that the word “dollar”
had the same meaning in 1791 that it does today, creating a problem
because inflation has reduced the purchasing power of the paper-money
legal-tender dollar. 39
But think about it, national legal-tender paper currency did not exist
in the United States in 1791: 40 there were no Federal Reserve Notes.41 The
37. Mortimer Sellers, Think of Your Latin When Hurling Accusations, NAT’L L. J., Feb. 9,
1998, at A1g (“Lawyers have earned a bad name for sophistry and manipulating language to mislead
to unwary.”).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
39. See Note, The Twenty Dollars Clause, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1665, 1672 (2005).
40. The “greenback” was created by the Legal Tender Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 345.
41. For a very brief recounting of the history, see Christopher M. Bruner, The Changing Face
of Money, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 383, 389–94 (2010); see also Ali Khan, The Evolution of
Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 393 (1999); Edwin Vieira, Jr., The
Forgotten Role of the Constitution in Monetary Law, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 77 (1997); Ajit V. Pai,
Congress and the Constitution: The Legal Tender Act of 1862, 77 OR. L. REV. 535 (1998).

244

CONLAWNOW

[9:235

word dollar almost certainly referred to the Spanish silver dollar weighing
416 grains and possibly other coins that were called “dollars” with closely
approximate silver content. 42 Traces of this meaning of dollar persisted
until 1965, when Congress enacted legislation ending the redeemability
of silver certificates for silver bullion. 43
This is an example of a “dollar” as that term was understood by the
public in 1791:

Note the date and the figure in profile. It is Charles the Fourth, the
king of Spain. This is a Spanish silver dollar, also known as a “Peso de
Ocho” or “piece of eight.” 44
The “greenback,” precursor to the modern Federal Reserve Note,
was not created until decades later and was the subject of much
controversy, cumulating in the back and forth of the Legal Tender
Cases, 45 with the Supreme Court first invalidating and then upholding
legal-tender paper currency. There is a long and complicated history that
led to the emergence of the contemporary “dollar,” which was tied to the
value of silver until a few decades ago. 46
Contemporary readers of the Seventh Amendment may have a strong
42. In 1791, the word “dollar” likely referred to the Spanish silver dollar, as congressional acts
from 1786 and 1792 indicate that the “dollar” was the Spanish silver dollar. See The Coinage Act of
April 2, 1792, 1 Stat. 246 § 9 (1792) (enabling Congress to coin “dollars or units—each to be the
value of a Spanish milled dollar.”); H.R. Rep. No. 23-278 at 65 (1834) (noting the Articles of
Confederation Congress used the Spanish silver dollar standard in 1786); see also Sumner, The
Spanish Dollar and the Colonial Shilling, 3 AMER. HIST. REV. 607 (1898).
STATES
DEP’T
OF
THE
TREASURY,
SILVER
CERTIFICATES,
43. UNITED
https://www.treasury.gov/about/history/collections/Pages/silver.aspx [https://perma.cc/E2LD-R4PJ]
See generally ARTHUR L. & IRA S. FRIEDBERG, PAPER MONEY OF THE UNITED STATES (2010).
44. Shepard Pond, The Spanish Dollar: The World’s Most Famous Silver Coin, 15 BULLETIN
OF THE BUSINESS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 12–6. (1941).
45. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869) overruled in part by Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S.
457 (1870); Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457 (1870); Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
46. For sources on the history, see supra note 41.
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linguistic intuition that “dollar” meant then what it means today, but that
intuition is incorrect. The eighteenth century “dollar” was a hard-money
coin with a value that depended on its silver content and not on a federal
statute that required that pieces of paper be accepted as payments. 47 The
primary referent of the term “dollar” in the Seventh Amendment is the
Spanish silver dollar or more precisely any coin with silver content
approximately equal to that of that “dollar.”
The examples of “domestic violence” and “dollar” illustrate the
importance of looking for the original public meaning of the
constitutional text. Some of the words and phrases in the constitutional
text have the same meaning today as they did when they were written. But
some don’t. And for that reason, we must always check our linguistic
intuitions against the historical evidence.
What would James Madison do is the wrong question. The right
question is: “What was the public meaning of the constitutional text?” The
word “public” is crucial. Public meaning originalism is a form of
textualism: we are looking for the meaning communicated to the public
by the text. 48 Public meaning is a function of both the semantic meaning
of the words and phrases and the context in which they occur. 49 The public
meaning of the text is the meaning that was conveyed to the public at the
time each provision was framed and ratified—not the literal meaning (just
the words) but the full meaning (including the role of context in resolving
ambiguities and enriching the text).
I am sure that many readers of this Article are not surprised to learn
that original intentions originalism has given way to public meaning
originalism. After all, there has been a lot of talk about “public meaning
originalism,” especially in the last few years. It came up in the
confirmation hearings for Neil Gorsuch. 50 Because Justice Scalia was a
very well known figure, even among the general public, his advocacy of
public meaning originalism may well have penetrated public
consciousness. The constitutional cognoscenti should know about public
meaning, and most of them do—although surprisingly, even sophisticated
writers still believe that originalism is all about original intent. 51
47. Solum, Originalist Methodology, supra note 1, at 281–82.
48. More precisely, public meaning originalism aims to recover the communicative content of
the constitutional text. See supra note 13.
49. For a fuller explanation of the idea of “public meaning,” see Solum, The Public Meaning
Thesis, supra note 1.
50. Lawrence B. Solum, Statement Presented at the Hearings on the Nomination of Honorable
Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 31 DIRITTO
PUBBLICO COMPARATO ED EUROPEO ONLINE 575 (2017).
51. Among the many examples is Linda Greenhouse, Justice Scalia’s Fading Legacy, N.Y.
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Even I myself was not fully aware that the transition from intent to
public meaning occurred in the 1980s until about twenty years later. I had
learned about “originalism” as a law student, judicial clerk, and in the first
year or two of my teaching career. I knew that originalism was dead. Not
just dead, but dead dead. Dead, dead, dead! Brest killed it. Dworkin drove
a wooden stake through its heart. Joe Biden demolished it at the Bork
hearings. It would not rise again.
But originalism is back! Not “Zombie Originalism,” propped up by
a motley crew of Neanderthal true believers. Originalism is back at the
center stage of debates about the Constitution—in the public square, in
the courts, and in the legal academy. And the move to public meaning is
the reason that originalism is back.
What is “public meaning” and how do we discover it? And now,
another surprise! Contemporary public meaning originalists do not
believe that we can reliably discover the public meaning of constitutional
text by looking the words up in Noah Webster’s dictionary of 1828 52 or
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary of 1755. 53 Those are the best two
dictionaries from the period, but they both have serious problems.
The first problem is that neither dictionary was compiled at the right
time. Samuel Johnson’s dictionary was compiled some three decades
before the Philadelphia Convention and it reports on usage in England and
not in the United States. Noah Webster’s dictionary was published about
four decades after the Philadelphia Convention, and it may well have been
influenced by debates about the Constitution.
The second problem concerns the accuracy and completeness of the
dictionaries. Either dictionary could misreport the conventional semantic
meanings of its era. Either dictionary could omit a meaning that was the
relevant public meaning of a constitutional provision once context is taken
into account. Lots of words, including some words used in the
Constitution, are omitted from these dictionaries. Neither dictionary
provides primary evidence of the patterns of usage that constitute
meaning.
Thus, originalists have begun to look for a better way to investigate
the meaning of words and phrases from the late eighteenth century and

TIMES, March 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/opinion/justice-antonin-scalialegacy.html [http://perma.cc/GG9D-77AN] (former Supreme Court reporter for the New York Times
and lecturer at Yale Law School stating, “Justice Scalia’s view [was] that the only legitimate basis for
interpreting the Constitution is the original intent of its framers . . . .”).
52. JOSHUA KENDALL, THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDING FATHER (2010).
53. See WALTER JACKSON BATE, SAMUEL JOHNSON Ch. 15 (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1975).
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from the mid-nineteenth century for the Reconstruction Amendments. It
turns out that those within the discipline of linguistics have been working
on this problem for quite some time. Ideally, we want to examine primary
evidence of usage. Forgive me for using a bit of jargon: we are looking
for the “conventional semantic meanings” of the words and phrases used
in the constitutional text. Until the 1990s, this involved laborious searches
through old texts and the transcription of examples: this is the method that
produced the magnificent Oxford Dictionary of the English Language.
But this approach has obvious limitations.
The surprising new approach is called “corpus linguistics.” This is
big data semantics. The use of this technique was pioneered by Associate
Chief Justice Thomas Lee of the Utah Supreme Court. 54 Corpus
lexicography was utilized by the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v.
Harris. 55 And there is a growing body of legal scholarship exploring and
using corpus techniques, 56 including an important article co-authored by
54. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 39, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); see also Note, State v Rasabout, 129 HARV L REV 1468 (2016).
Justice Lee’s law clerk, Stephen Mouritsen, should be credited with the introduction of corpus
lexicography to the theory of statutory and constitutional interpretation. See Stephen C. Mouritsen,
Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics As an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning,
13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156 (2012); Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not A
Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and A Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU. L.
REV. 1915, 1915 (2010). At about the same time as Mouritsen’s article, Neal Goldfarb authored a
groundbreaking brief, Brief for the Project on Government Oversight, the Brechner Center for
Freedom of Information, and Tax Analysts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, FCC v. AT&T,
Inc.
The
brief
is
available
at
:
https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_09_1279_PetitionerAmCuPOG
O_BrechnerCtr_andTaxAnalystsnew.authcheckdam.pdf.
55. People v. Harris, 499 Mich. 332, 347, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838–39 (2016):
Keeping in mind that we must interpret the word “information” as used in the DLEOA
“according to the common and approved usage of the language,” we apply a tool that can
aid in the discovery of “how particular words or phrases are actually used in written or
spoken English.” The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) allows users
to “analyze [ ] ordinary meaning through a method that is quantifiable and verifiable.”
Id; see also Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., No. CV 16-2394 (DLF), 2018 WL
1542049 , fn. 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2018) (“The database, called the Corpus of Historical American
English, is a giant repository of text that houses more than 400 million words collected from fiction,
non-fiction, magazines, and newspapers published from 1810 to 2017. A search at
corpus.byu.edu/coha for “rural district”shows a dramatic decline in usage beginning around 1950.”)
56. See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor:
Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181
(2017); Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics Help Make Originalism Scientific?, 126 YALE
L.J. FORUM 57 (2016); James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner, Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics &
Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM
20 (2016); Daniel Ortner, The Merciful Corpus: The Rule of Lenity, Ambiguity and Corpus
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Justice Lee and Stephen Mouritsen. 57 The corpus approach has recently
been applied 58 to a case pending before the United States Supreme Court
that hinges on the meaning of the phrase “officer of the United States” in
the Appointments Clause, Lucia v. SEC. 59
Corpus linguistics provides a rigorous data-driven approach to
constitutional semantics. It allows us to identify the range of possible
meanings of the various words and phrases that make up the constitutional
text. Sometimes that is the end of the matter. Some of the words and
phrases that comprise the constitutional text may be unambiguous, having
one and only one possible meaning. But this is actually rare. When you
look up a word in the dictionary, you are likely to find multiple
definitions—corresponding to multiple meanings. So, the next step in the
determination of original public meaning is disambiguation: which of the
possible meanings was actually communicated to the public?
This brings us to the role of context. Again, there are some surprises.
Even very sophisticated scholars and judges may make the mistake of
equating originalist “textualism” with “literalism.” Thus, originalism may
be criticized for being “acontextual”60 for ignoring the role of context in
the production of meaning. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Originalism has always been concerned with context. Serious
applied originalism has always involved exhaustive historical research
that attempts to recreate the context in which the constitutional text was
written. And recent constitutional theory has labored hard to provide the
theoretical foundations that connect historical context to original public
meaning.
Lawyers intuitively know that the full “meaning” of writing is not
reducible to its literal meaning. This same insight can be restated using
the vocabulary of linguistics: the communicative content of a written text

Linguistics, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 101 (2016); D. Carolina Núñez, War of the Words: Aliens,
Immigrants, Citizens, and the Language of Exclusion, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1517 (2013).
57. Thomas R. Lee and Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L. J. 788
(2018).
58. See Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443,
453 (2018); James Cleith Phillips, Jacob Crump, and Benjamin Lee, Investigating the Original
Meaning of ‘Officers of the United States’ with the Corpus of Founding-Era American English
(unpublished
manuscript)
(March
24,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3126975.
59. Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir.
2016), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated (Feb. 16, 2017), on reh’g en banc, 868 F.3d 1021
(D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom. Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018).
60. See Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, and Absent Victims: The Lessons of Regina v.
Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 159
(2010) (criticizing “Justice Scalia’s atomized, acontextual originalism”).
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is richer than its semantic meaning. Where does the “extra” meaning come
from?
First, something obvious: context allows us to resolve ambiguities.
The Constitutional text uses the word “Senate”: without consideration of
context, that word could refer to the Roman Senate or the Senate of
University College, London. But in context, it is clear that the word
“Senate” refers to one of the two houses of Congress—the United States
Senate. Contextual disambiguation is one of the keys to the recovery of
public meaning.
Second, something surprising: context enriches meaning—it adds
new meaning in surprising ways. There is a fancy name for this:
“pragmatic enrichment.” What is that? Let’s start with some simple
examples:
• “Jack and Jill are married.” Ordinarily when we say this, we
communicate more than we literally said. Jack and Jill are
married—to each other. The “to each other” is unstated but
implicit in what has been said. The fancy name for this is
“impliciture.” 61
• “Bob is no longer the dean.” When you say this, you also
communicate what is called a “presupposition.” Bob was
once the dean.
• Someone writes a letter of recommendation for a former
student who is applying to be a Supreme Court Clerk. The
letter says, “Ann was punctual, and she regularly attended
class. I recommend her.” And that is all the letter says. Of
course, this letter communicates another message: don’t hire
Ann! The technical name for this kind of enrichment is
“implicature.”
The Constitution is full of implicitures: like many statutes, the
Constitution frequently omits explicit reference to geographic scope, but
most of its provisions apply only to the United States—the missing “in the
United States” is an impliciture. One of the most famous examples of
presupposition is the Ninth Amendment. It says, “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.” 62 The text does not explicitly say that there
are any “rights . . . retained by the people” but nonetheless communicates
the existence of such rights.
Even sophisticated constitutional scholars may not be aware of a

61.
62.

Note that “impliciture” is spelled differently than the related term “implicature.”
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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linguistic phenomenon that is called “modulation.” 63 We can actually
change the meaning of a word by using it in a way where the new meaning
becomes clear. For example, the Recess Appointments Clause in the
United States Constitution uses the phrases “recess of the Senate” and
“session of the Senate.” Literally, a recess of the Senate could be a break
of any kind. In fact, Noah Webster’s dictionary gave the following as the
sixth definition of “recess”: “Remission or suspension of business or
procedure; as, the house of representatives had a recess of half an hour.” 64
So, the President could make recess appointments while the Senate was at
lunch. But that is probably not the meaning of “recess of the Senate.” The
Constitution juxtaposes “recess” and “session.” Here is the language:
“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall
expire at the End of their next Session.” 65 Recess and session are opposed
to one another in a way that communicates a new and special meaning of
“recess” that is limited to the period between sessions.
You may be surprised by the fact that originalist scholars and judges
have engaged in deep and serious study of linguistics and the philosophy
of language. Of course, legal scholars have done interdisciplinary work
for decades: the law and economics movement has been the most
prominent example. We should not be surprised that twenty-first century
originalists are using the theories and empirical methods of linguistic
science to facilitate the rigorous and objective investigation of the original
meaning of the constitutional text.
III. SOME SURPRISING IMPLICATIONS
Enough theory! Let’s get down to brass tacks. Does originalism have
surprising implications for the way that cases will be decided?
A.

The Surprising Myth: Originalism is an Inherently Conservative
Judicial Ideology

Let’s start with the myth: originalism is an inherently conservative
judicial ideology. 66 This myth did not come out of nowhere; it was not
made up out of whole cloth. The rise of originalism was associated with
63. For the exceptions, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
269, 288-91(2017); Lee and Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 57 at 816 n.126;
http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/recess
64. MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
[https://perma.cc/J25Z-AV2H] (last visited May 21, 2018).
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § II
66. See supra note 5.
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conservative critiques of the Warren Court.67 But it is one thing to identify
conservatism as part of the “origins story” of originalism. It is quite
another to say that originalist constitutional theory itself is inherently
conservative.
In fact, it would be quite surprising if originalism had contemporary
conservative political ideology baked into its DNA. Critics of the Warren
Court could have taken a quite different path than originalism: they could
have argued that living constitutionalism was a good thing, but that the
court should be packed with hardline conservatives who will translate
their policy agenda into constitutional law. What a counterproductive
move that would have been—with no political appeal to moderates of
either party. Instead, the critique focused on the rule of law and
democratic legitimacy. The Supreme Court was acting lawlessly, because
it was ignoring the original meaning of the constitutional text. The Court
was acting undemocratically, because it was striking down actions by
democratically elected legislators—in cases where the text of the
Constitution did not so require. In my opinion, it seems highly likely that
these lines of criticism were sincere, but they were also attractive to
advocates of originalism because they were more effective, both
strategically and rhetorically. 68 Strategically, an appeal to the rule of law
was more likely to succeed with moderates. Rhetorically, the rule of law
and democratic values are more appealing than an open call to politicize
the judiciary.
This does not mean that conservative critics of the Warren Court did
not care about results. Obviously, they did. But it does mean that they
became committed to a theory that is ideologically neutral at its core.
Originalism commits us to the idea that we must follow the Constitution
wherever it leads, whether the destination is conservative or libertarian,
liberal or progressive.
B.

The Surprising Reality: Some Progressive Implications of an Old
Constitution

At this point, I think the following objection will occur to many
readers. Sure, conservatives advanced a neutral theory that emphasized
the rule of law and democratic legitimacy, but they only did that because
they believed that we have a very old constitution that favors their
conservative agenda. We will never know whether this speculation about
67. See supra note 4.
68. For an illuminating discussion of the rhetoric associated with originalism, see rhetoric
Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009).
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motives is entirely true because it is very difficult to discover decisive
evidence of deep motives. But my opinion is that it is at least partially
correct with respect to support of originalism by politicians: originalism
garnered political support because it embraced a constitutional text that
seemed sensible to early advocates of originalism. But is it true that our
constitution is conservative, root and branch, through and through?
Again, it would be surprising if a Constitution born in the aftermath
of revolution and revised to guarantee the rights of the former slaves had
no liberal or progressive provisions. Moreover, we are quite distant from
the ideological world of the late eighteenth century or the mid-nineteenth
century: it would be very surprising indeed if their political ideas mapped
neatly onto ours. Of course, an on-balance assessment of the ideological
implications of the original meaning of the constitutional text is a very big
job; too big for a single article. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some
surprising implications of an originalist approach.
1. Gender Equality and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Of course, the Constitution includes an explicit gender equality
provision, the Nineteenth Amendment: “The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of sex.” 69 Aside from the right to vote, the
Constitution does not create explicit gender equality rights. But the
constitutional text does employ the words “person” and “citizen.” Women
are persons. Women are citizens. This was not in doubt in 1787 when the
constitutional text was drafted in Philadelphia; or in 1791 when twelve
amendments were proposed and ten ratified; or during Reconstruction
when the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments became part
of the Constitution.
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. 70

69.
70.

U.S. CONST. amend. 19.
U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1.
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The passage in italics is the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Most
educated Americans know something about “due process” and “equal
protection,” but even among lawyers, knowledge of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is rare. Why is that? The answer is living
constitutionalism: the Supreme Court adopted an interpretation of the
clause that had the effect of making it a virtual dead letter in two notorious
cases, the Slaughter-House Cases 71 and United States v. Cruikshank. 72
Originalists differ among themselves about the meaning of the somewhat
mysterious phrase, “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States,” 73 but a leading and plausible interpretation is that these
“privileges or immunities” include both the specific rights spelled out in
the Bill of Rights and the basic common law rights (or natural rights),
including the rights to own property, enter into contracts, and to pursue a
lawful occupation.
What does this have to do with gender equality? An originalist
answer to this question begins with the very unoriginalist decision of the
Supreme Court in Bradwell v. Illinois. 74 Myra Bradwell passed the bar
examination in Illinois but was denied her right to pursue a lawful
occupation. What occupation could be more “lawful” than the practice of
law? A living constitutionalist Supreme Court denied her claim on the
basis of precedent, but Chief Justice Salmon Chase dissented. The Chief
Justice was very ill and did not write an opinion, but if he had, I believe
that it would have been an originalist dissent, arguing that Myra Bradwell
was a citizen and therefore entitled to practice law. 75
Here is how one recent scholar summarizes the originalist case for
Bradwell’s claim:
The privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States include
a set of rights termed basic rights. These basic rights are a set of
fundamental civil rights, which includes the rights in the first eight
amendments to the constitution, the rights of Article I sections 9 and 10,
and the right to own property, enter into contracts, and pursue a lawful
occupation: all of the basic rights (whether conceived of as natural or

71. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
72. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
73. Compare RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (rev. ed. 2014) with
KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014).
74. Bradwell v. People of State of Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
75. For a description of the case, see M. Frances Rooney, The Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and an Originalist Defense of Gender Nondiscrimination, 15 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 737 (2017).
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common law rights) must be extended to women given the original
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Because these rights are granted to all citizens, discrimination on the
basis of gender as to these rights is an unconstitutional violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment unless it is true as a matter of fact that women
are not capable of exercising these rights. This is the same principle that
was used to deny women the right to practice law in Bradwell, on the
grounds that they were unable to do so as a matter of fact. Likewise,
children, who are obviously citizens but are not factually able to enter
into valid contracts of their own volition, are still protected by this grant
of rights as a matter of law. Though many in the nineteenth century may
have believed that women were intellectually unable to exercise them,
this is clearly, demonstrably false. If women lacked the ability to
exercise one of these substantive basic rights, preventing them from
doing so would not be a constitutional violation. Likewise, if an activity
in question is not one of these substantive basic rights, preventing them
from doing so is also not a constitutional violation. 76

At this point, I imagine that some readers will object that I am trying to
pull a fast one. Many of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment would have been quite surprised and even appalled by Myra
Bradwell’s argument. Don’t originalists believe that their intentions
should govern us today? Surprisingly, the answer is no, no, no!
Even if the Supreme Court had not gutted the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in Slaughterhouse, the Court would probably have
denied Myra Bradwell’s claim. That is because the Justices (like most
male Americans at the time) believed that women lacked the intellectual
capacity to practice law. But that is a belief about facts and not about
original meaning. Originalists believe that the original meaning of the
constitutional text is fixed and that it binds us, but they do not believe that
the framers’ beliefs about facts are binding: that would be just plain silly.
The meaning of a legal text is one thing. The facts to which that text
applies is quite another. Originalism requires that we apply the original
public meaning of the constitutional text to the facts as they exist today
given current understandings. Let me say that another way: originalism
rejects the idea that our view of the facts to which the constitution applies
should be frozen in time by the beliefs of the framers about circumstances
that no longer exist.
Once we combine the original meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause with the truth about women’s intellectual capacities,

76.

Id. at 32-33.
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Bradwell v. Illinois is an easy case from an originalist perspective. Sadly,
even if the Supreme Court had embraced the original public meaning of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, it would not have helped Myra
Bradwell herself, because of epistemic injustice: 77 the Justices (aside from
Chief Justice Chase) were not prepared to listen to women about their own
intellectual capacities. It is remarkable that even in 1873, the contention
that the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected
women like Myra Bradwell from irrational discrimination was not beyond
the pale.
But society eventually did come to realize that the intellectual
capacities of women were equal to those of men. By the time the
Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in 1920, the change in factual beliefs
had crystallized into constitutional law. Had the Court followed the
original meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, it could have
given us a powerful gender equality jurisprudence about fifty years before
the Supreme Court’s living constitutionalist jurisprudence of the 1970s.
2. The Technicalities of Pleading and the Seventh Amendment
The next surprise is only exciting to law geeks. The original meaning
of the Seventh Amendment would require the Supreme Court to overrule
its notorious decisions in Twombly 78 and Iqbal, 79 two pleading decisions
that have split the Court along ideological lines. If you aren’t a lawyer,
you might say, “Who cares about the technicalities of pleading?” But all
Americans should care about the role of the civil jury. Twombly and Iqbal
introduced a new pleading standard that gives judges power to dismiss
cases before the plaintiff even has a chance to conduct discovery and
thereby insures that claims will never come before a jury. This has
important implications: plaintiff’s lawyers know that the ability to get to
a jury is critical.
Civil procedure scholars have complained about plausibility
77. The concept of epistemic injustice has been developed in a substantial literature. See, e.g.,
MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 27-28 (2007)
(developing idea of systemic testimonial injustice); JOSÉ MEDINA, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF
RESISTANCE: GENDER AND RACIAL OPPRESSION, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE, AND RESISTANT
IMAGINATIONS (2012) (developing a theory of epistemic injustice); Alison Bailey, The Unlevel
Knowing Field: An Engagement with Dotson’s Third-Order Epistemic Oppression, 3 SOCIAL
EPISTEMOLOGY REVIEW AND REPLY COLLECTIVE
62 (2014), http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1Gs
[https://perma.cc/5A9Q-RC2X ] (developing conception of an unlevel knowing field); Kristie
Dotson, Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing, 26 HYPATIA 236 (2011)
(developing notion of testimonial quieting).
78. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545–46 (2007).
79. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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pleading as a matter of the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure—and, in my opinion, they are right to do so on grounds that
are essentially originalist in nature. But there is a more fundamental
problem that emerges if we take the original meaning of the Seventh
Amendment seriously. The Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law. 80

At common law, plaintiffs had a right to a jury trial if they survived a
demurrer. But the common law demurrer did not allow for judges to assess
the plausibility of the plaintiff’s factual allegations. From an originalist
perspective, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Rule 12 in Twiqbal (as
the two cases are known together) seems to violate the Seventh
Amendment’s command to preserve the right to jury trial in suits at
common law. 81
Speaking of civil procedure, the original meaning of the Seventh
Amendment is likely to have many implications that ought to be
welcomed by progressives and liberals. Two of these are especially
important: mandatory arbitration and summary judgment. The liberals on
the Supreme Court were sharply critical of the Supreme Court’s decisions
that the Federal Arbitration Act precluded class action suits in cases where
the plaintiffs had agreed to an arbitration clause in a form contract. The
Seventh Amendment may invalidate these clauses, because it is not clear
that they were valid under the common law in 1791. 82 The Supreme Court
has upheld the use of summary judgment to prevent cases from getting to
a jury, but scholars have argued that the modern practice of summary
judgment is contrary to the original meaning of the Seventh
Amendment. 83
80. U.S. CONST. amend. 7.
81. Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on to
Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 262 (2009) (“[I]t is unconstitutional to give a judge
the power to weigh the factual heft of a complaint at the outset of a civil case and to dismiss it as
insufficient.”).
82. For an investigation of these issues that does not use the resources of originalism, see Judge
Craig Smith and Judge Eric V. Moyé, Outsourcing American Civil Justice: Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer and Employment Contracts, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 282 (2012).
83. The key work has been done by Suja Thomas, who does not employ the resources of the
most sophisticated forms of public meaning originalism. See SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING
AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL,
AND GRAND JURIES (2016); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA.
L. REV. 139 (2007).
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You may be thinking to yourself, “Hey! If the Seventh Amendment
is so important, then why didn’t Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas say
so?” Fair question. I cannot answer on their behalf, but I do know this: the
advocates in many of the recent cases haven’t bothered to make originalist
arguments. Perhaps, this is because they are ignorant of the original
meaning of the right to jury trial in civil cases. I can almost guarantee very
few of them studied the original meaning of any provision of the
Constitution in law school. Or perhaps, the failure to present originalist
arguments stems from the fact that most liberal and progressive advocates
just don’t see the possibility that original meaning could favor their side.
3. Mass Incarceration and the Eighth Amendment
What? Mass incarceration! How is the original public meaning of the
constitutional text of any help in dealing with what is surely the most
important challenge facing the criminal justice system? The answer may
lie in the text of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution: “Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” 84The best originalist work on the Eighth
Amendment has been done by John Stinneford. 85 He discovered
something quite surprising about the meaning of the word “unusual.” The
contemporary meaning of the word “unusual” focuses on frequency. For
example, Merriam Webster defines “unusual” as “uncommon” or
“rare.” 86
But that was not the meaning in 1791 when the Eighth Amendment
was framed and ratified. Here is Stinneford’s description of the original
public meaning of “unusual”:
In conclusion, American courts of the first half of the nineteenth century
shared the Framers’ understanding that the word “unusual” in the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause meant “contrary to long usage.” They
generally upheld punishments that were consonant with common law
precedent and were willing to strike down those that were not, even if
such punishments did not involve the infliction of physical pain or
degradation. Moreover, American courts in this period demonstrated
awareness that even traditional common law punishments could become

84. U.S. CONST. amend. 8.
85. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar
to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2008); John F. Stinneford, The Original
Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 506 (2017).
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unusual
86. MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
[https://perma.cc/PD63-S459] (last visited May 21, 2018).
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unusual if they actually fell out of usage. 87

Stinneford marshals impressive evidence for this thesis and explains how
the original meaning of unusual fit the eighteenth-century understanding
of the nature of the common law.
What does this have to do with mass incarceration? Given the
original meaning of “cruel,” there is no question that prison sentences that
last for decades are “cruel” as that word was understood by the public in
the eighteenth century: “The original meaning of the word ‘cruel’ in the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is unjustly harsh.” 88 Judged
against the relevant baseline—punishment practices that were long in use
and approved by the common law in 1791—there is a powerful argument
that modern multiyear sentences are both “cruel” and “unusual.” Of
course, there are many reasons for the emergence of mass incarceration,
but the imposition of lengthy sentences is clearly one of the root causes.
How would the argument go? I imagine that it would look something
like this:
Mass incarceration is founded on sentencing practices that constitute
cruel and unusual punishment—not because of any fancy new theory,
not because of changing values and circumstances, not because we have
come to realize that mass incarceration is bad policy. The carceral state
is unconstitutional because it depends on punishments (long prison
sentences) that are harsh, unjust, and were contrary to long usage in
1791. Mass incarceration cannot be sustained given the original public
meaning of the Eighth Amendment.

I am not sure that this argument works. I am not an Eighth Amendment
specialist, and I have done neither the corpus linguistics work nor careful
study of the constitutional record. But I do find Stinneford’s surprising
theory to be plausible and if he is right, then the original public meaning
of the Eighth Amendment may well have surprising implications for our
practices of punishment.
This article is entitled “Surprising Originalism,” and I have been
pointing out some of the surprising implications of originalism. But don’t
get me wrong. originalism has implications that are unsurprising and
many of these implications will be welcome to conservatives but
anathema to liberals. For example, I think it is likely that the original
public meaning of Article One would be inconsistent with the modern
expansive interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Clause. I suspect that

87.
88.

Stinneford, Original Meaning of “Unusual,” supra note 85, at 1814-15.
Stinneford, Original Meaning of “Cruel,” supra note 85, at 506.
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the original public meaning of the grants of “legislative power” to
Congress, “judicial power” to Article Three courts, and “executive
power” to the President is difficult to reconcile with independent
administrative agencies that combine legislative and judicial power with
executive power that is almost entirely free of presidential direction. The
political valence of public meaning originalism is a mixed bag: there is
something for everyone, but everything for no one.
C.

What About Segregation?

At this point, I imagine that many readers will want to know about
the implications of originalism for segregation, Plessy v. Ferguson, 89 and
Brown v. Board of Education. 90 Brown is what constitutional scholars call
a “canonical” case, by which they mean that Brown is considered a fixed
point, a case that is surely right. 91 Plessy is an “anti-canonical” case—also
a fixed point, but on the “wrongly decided” side of line.92 Given these
starting points, originalism must be rejected if it is inconsistent with
Brown or if it would endorse Plessy. Discussion of these issues by living
constitutionalist scholars usually begins and ends with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause does not enter into the conversation.
What does originalism have to say about Brown and Plessy? The first
step is to identify the relevant parts of the constitutional text. And now
another surprise! The Equal Protection Clause is the wrong place to look.
Why? Here is a clue: contemporary understandings of the Equal
Protection Clause almost always cut off the final three words “of the
laws.” What did “equal protection of the laws” mean? The primary
function of what we should call the Protection of Laws Clause was to
ensure that the former slaves would receive the same protection of their
personal security and property as other persons. The clause accomplishes
this end by requiring states to provide every person protection of the laws
on an equal basis—”equal protection of the laws.” Another surprise is that
reading renders an affirmative duty of protection on state governments:

89. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
90. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
91. See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 681–82 (2005) (Some canonical cases, like Brown v. Board of
Education, are uniformly understood as data points that any serious theory of constitutional law must
justify and explain.); Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education,
52 Rutgers L. Rev. 383 (2000).
92. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 412 (2011).
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this result would undermine the controversial DeShaney case. 93 In that
case, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, “[T]he Due Process Clauses
generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where
such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of
which the government itself may not deprive the individual.” 94 But from
an originalist perspective, the Court was looking at the wrong clause. The
place to look for an affirmative obligation for government to provide
persons protections of the laws is the full Equal Protection of the Laws
Clause, not merely the Equal Protection Clause, leaving “of the Laws”
out. That clause does seem to require “protection of the laws.” But it was
not addressed by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Therefore, the Equal Protection Clause is the wrong place to look.
Where is the right place? A good way to answer that question is to
examine what actually happened in Plessy v. Ferguson. 95
The following is my understanding of Plessy v. Ferguson, but keep
in mind that I am not an expert and I have not done the necessary work to
assure you that this account is correct. When Homer Plessy challenged the
Louisiana statute that required the segregation of railroad cars, his primary
argument was based on the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 96 This may
come as a surprise to many law students who come away from class
assuming that Plessy was all about the Equal Protection Clause. 97
Restated in modern terms, the essence of Plessy’s argument was that
access to a public carrier (a railroad) was one of the privileges or
immunities (basic rights) that states may not deny to any citizen.98 Plessy
v. Ferguson dismissed this claim out of hand, relying on the
Slaughterhouse Cases. If the Plessy Court had followed the original
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and if it had not had
erroneous factual beliefs about the mixing of the races, Plessy could have

93. For a brief review of the issues, see Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the SenseReference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 604 (2006).
94. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
95. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
96. See CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
152-62, 164-68 (1987) (citing Brief for Plaintiff in Error, submitted by Albion Tourgée and James C.
Walker, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Brief for Plaintiff in Error, submitted by S.F.
Phillips and F.D. McKenny, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); see also Barry P. McDonald,
A Reluctant Apology for Plessy: A Response to Akhil Amar, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 91, 99 (2011).
97. Michael Klarman’s The Plessy Era does not even mention the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. See Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303 (1998).
98. As noted earlier in connection with gender equality, there is a serious dispute about the
original public meaning of the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” See
supra note 7073.
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prevailed, and Jim Crow might never have gotten off the ground. 99
Nonetheless, a living constitutionalist Supreme Court rejected
Plessy’s claims: the separate but equal doctrine reflected the Court’s view
that segregation was consistent with what we now would call
“contemporary circumstances and values.” It was not until Brown v.
Board that the Supreme Court reversed course: circumstances and values
had changed. The Brown Court did not even consider the possibility that
the relevant constitutional provision was the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.
The world of 1954 was substantially different than the world of 1868
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. Originalism is committed
to the public meaning of the constitutional text, and the public meaning is
fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified. But originalism is
not committed to the patently ridiculous proposition that facts about the
world are fixed or the even more ludicrous position that the application of
the public meaning to current facts should be guided by the factual beliefs
of the public at the time constitutional provisions were framed and
ratified—much less the absolutely insane idea that the false beliefs of the
framers about facts bind us today. That is why the original meaning of the
privileges and immunities clause can support gender equality rights—
even though most men thought that the intellectual capacity of women
was childlike and therefore women could be treated like children by the
law. Originalism is committed to the constitutional text—not the factual
beliefs of the people who wrote the text. At this point, I hope that readers
will no longer find that conclusion surprising.
So, what about Brown v. Board of Education? Was it supported by
the original public meaning of the constitutional text given the facts as
they were known in 1954? This is a large question. The eminent

99. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1462–63 (1992):
The Supreme Court upheld a railroad car segregation law in Plessy v. Ferguson. Although
symmetrical, the law restricted the right to contract by forbidding a white citizen from
buying a ticket on a car that carried blacks. It also limited the even more fundamental
privilege of natural liberty because the black passenger was not allowed to walk into the
white train car. The law should have been held invalid. The same is true with respect to
segregated public education. Schools financed by general taxation are very probably a
privilege of citizens. If so, to give individuals of different races different versions of the
privilege would constitute an abridgment.
Id. (footnotes omitted). In my opinion much work needs to be done on the original public meaning of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but as opposed to Klarman, Harrison actually does have a theory
of the meaning of the clause and an argument that this meaning is inconsistent with Plessy and
consistent with Brown.
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constitutional scholar Michael McConnell stated in a subsequent
summary of his famous article: 100
As originally proposed by Senator Charles Sumner, the Civil Rights Act
guaranteed equality in access to various types of public accommodation,
including railroads, inns, theaters, steamboats, cemeteries, and—most
controversially—public schools. 101

**
In numerous votes between introduction of the bill in 1870 and passage
of a stripped-down version of the bill in 1875, majorities in both Houses
of Congress supported the desegregation position. At the high-water
mark in May and June of 1874, the bill passed the Senate by a vote of
29-16 and won the support of the House (on a procedural vote) by a
margin of 141-72. That comes close to two-thirds. The margin of victory
among supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment was far higher.
Moreover, both Houses consistently rejected versions of the bill that
would have allowed separate-but-equal facilities. The bill failed only
because procedural rules in the House, permitting filibustering and
dilatory motions, made a two-thirds vote necessary. Supporters of the
bill came tantalizingly close, but could never break that barrier. On one
fateful date in June, 1874, the switch of just two votes would have
carried the measure, and the requirement of school desegregation would
have been written into the law. Would history not have looked different
if those two votes had changed?
But the bill, in its strong version, failed. The Democrats were able to
stave off action on the bill in the House throughout 1874. Then, in the
elections of that November, the Democrats won a landslide victory.
When the lame duck Congress met in early 1875, the Republican
majority was demoralized. Even then, their last great project was
passage of the civil rights bill. The Democrats were willing to acquiesce
in the bill if it were amended to permit separate-but-equal schools, but
the Republicans angrily denounced this effort to introduce what they
called “invidious discrimination in the laws of this country.” They
preferred to delete coverage of schools from the bill altogether, rather
than to countenance a separate-but-equal provision for schools. That did
not mean that their constitutional interpretation had changed, but only
that their political power to achieve enforcement of that interpretation
had changed. Supporters of desegregated education still had hopes for

100. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947 (1995).
101. Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 459 (1996).

2018]

SURPRISING ORIGINALISM

263

the courts. James Monroe, Republican from Ohio, stated that black
Americans “think their chances for good schools will be better under the
Constitution with the protection of the courts than under a bill containing
such provisions as this.”
Defeat of the schools provision was fateful as a legislative matter, but
viewing the course of deliberations as an exercise in constitutional
interpretation by persons well situated to know and understand the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the evidence of original
meaning survives the defeat of the bill. Large majorities of both houses
of Congress, and even larger majorities of supporters of the Fourteenth
Amendment, concluded that it forbade de jure segregation of public
schools. That fact puts to rest the notion that the Supreme Court had to
disregard the original meaning of the Amendment in order to “do the
right thing” in Brown. 102

In this very short article, I cannot state the full case, but I hope this
extended quotation gives you a lively sense of McConnell’s argument. 103
More recent originalist scholarship reaches a similar conclusion on the
basis of additional evidence and explicit focus on public meaning. 104
If you are in the “in crowd,” you were not surprised by my invocation
102. Id. at 463–64.
103. The argument would be stated differently if it were made today using the state-of-the-art
version of public meaning originalism.
104. Steven G. Calabresi and Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education,
2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 436–37 (2014)
We conclude that by 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, citizens in
thirty out of thirty-seven states had a fundamental right to a public school education that
was a privilege or immunity of state citizenship. As a result, the Fourteenth Amendment
forbade racial segregation in public schools from the moment it was adopted. Thus, the
original public meaning of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racial
segregation in public schools.
The only serious engagement with Calabresi and Perl’s argument is found in an article by Ronald
Turner. See Ronald Turner, The Problematics of the Brown-Is-Originalist Project, 23 J.L. & POL’Y
591, 637 (2015). Turner’s argument is not fully articulated, but it can be reconstructed as the claim
that: (1) the right to attend a public school is a “social” right in contradistinction to “political” and
“civil” rights, (2) social rights are excluded from the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States, and therefore (3) Brown is not supported by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. These issues
are complex and even a cursory discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. My sense is that it is
not clear that the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” had the same
communicative content as “civil rights” and that the categorical division between “civil,” “political,”
and “social” rights was highly uncertain at the time. If privileges or immunities include the important
or fundamental rights of citizens that are legally enforceable and if there was in 1954 a general
prevailing and legally enforceable right to public education that was then fundamental or important,
then the original public meaning of the text would support the decision in Brown v. Board. In this
Article, I am not claiming that this view is correct. Rather my claim is that the widely accepted belief
that it has been demonstrated that Brown is inconsistent with the original public meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause is not well supported.
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of McConnell’s argument—which is well known to constitutional
scholars who debate the merits of originalism. And it is likely that you
believe that Michael Klarman proved that McConnell was wrong in an
equally famous article. 105 And you might even believe that Klarman’s
article addressed the original public meaning of the constitutional text and
demonstrated that it supported segregation of public schools. Some might
say that is the “conventional wisdom.”
At this point, sophisticated readers surely see the surprise that is
coming. 106 Klarman wrote his article in 1995 and, like most constitutional
scholars at the time, he seems to have been unaware of the existence of
public meaning originalism. The phrase “public meaning” does not appear
in his article—not even once. The article does mention the Privileges or
Immunities Clause once and only once, 107 but it does not quote the clause
or interpret the language of the clause, much less undertake an
investigation of the public meaning of the text. Klarman offers no
evidence of the public meaning of the clause. I doubt that in the 1990s,
Klarman had even a vague idea that originalists were seeking the
communicative content conveyed to the public by the constitutional
text—no wonder that he did not discuss the public meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. As an exercise in public meaning
originalism, Klarman’s article is not a failure, because he does not even
try. 108 Klarman’s principal argument is that the public opposed school
integration, but this evidence does not even establish that the original
expected application of the Privileges or Immunities Clause would have
supported Plessy and opposed Brown.
Klarman’s argument does not take into account the distinction
between original public meaning (which is fixed) and beliefs about facts
(which do change over time). Even if Klarman had produced an argument
that demonstrated that the public believed that the Privileges or
105. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881, 1883 (1995) (stating “the four principal difficulties with
McConnell’s originalist defense of Brown based on the 1875 CRA debates” are “his focus on legal
principle rather than actual practice, his prioritization of congressional sentiment over popular
opinion, his failure adequately to consider the possibility of values changing over time, and his
equation of ‘full and equal enjoyment’ language with integrationism”).
106. An example of a sophisticated approach to Brown and originalism is found in Michael C.
Dorf, The Undead Constitution, supra note 14 (recognizing that it is original-expected applications
originalism that may be inconsistent with Brown).
107. Klarman, supra note 105, at 1889.
108. The failure to engage public meaning originalism’s implications for the relationship
between the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been repeated more recently. See Ronald
Turner, Justice Antonin Scalia’s Flawed Originalist Justification for Brown v. Board of Education, 9
WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 179, 193 (2017).
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Immunities Clause was consistent with segregation, his argument would
not be complete until he examines the reasons for this belief and shows
that they were based on the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and not on factual beliefs that we now know are false. Klarman’s
article barely mentions the Privileges or Immunities Clause: it does not
even hint at a theory of its meaning.
The notion that originalism is inconsistent with Brown has become
an article of faith among scholars. Richard Fallon, one of the most careful
and fair-minded constitutional theorists, wrote in 2018, “Most of those
who have examined the evidence have concluded that the original
contextual meaning permitted segregated schools to survive.” 109 Fallon’s
phrase “original contextual meaning” is his way of expressing the same
notion that most scholars call “original public meaning.” But in fact, there
is no scholarship of which I am aware (and no evidence that Fallon
cites 110) that demonstrates that the original public meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause is consistent with segregation given the
actual facts—as opposed to false factual beliefs in 1868. Let me say it one
more time: Klarman’s article makes no arguments that demonstrate that
Brown is inconsistent with the original public meaning of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. None. Not one. Nada. Nil. Zero. Zip. 111
109. RICHARD FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 52 (2018).
110. The footnote for the passage quoted at text accompanying note 109 reads in full as follows:
“21. The sole prominent exception is Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1885-93 (1995).” Fallon, Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court,
supra note 109, at 186 n.21. The next footnote is to Klarman, supra note105. Fallon is not alone here.
As William Eskridge observed, “The consensus among law professors is that Brown is hard to defend
on originalist grounds.” William N. Eskridge Jr., Original Meaning and Marriage Equality, 52 HOUS.
L. REV. 1067, 1088 n.96 (2015). (A quick aside: Eskridge himself does not endorse the consensus.)
The point here is that this consensus is based on work by Klarman that did not engage with public
meaning originalism. There may be a consensus that Brown is inconsistent with the original public
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it turns out that the scholarship on which the consensus
is based does not address the Privileges or Immunities Clause. It seems likely that Fallon was unaware
of John Harrison’s work on the Privileges or Immunities Clause which predated the McConnellKlarman debate. See Harrison, supra note 99. Fallon’s discussion is framed in terms of the Equal
Protection Clause and does not even mention the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Fallon, supra
note 109, at 52. Fallon does not discuss other work, including that of Steven Calabresi and Michael
Perl, see Calabresi & Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 104, but it is
possible that Fallon was aware of this work but did not consider it “prominent.”
111. This is not to say that Klarman’s evidence has no bearing on the original public meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Evidence that the public opposed school integration is secondary
evidence that the public would have expected that the application of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause would not have invalidated the segregation of public schools. It is not very strong evidence,
because it seems unlikely that members of the public actually had a specific expectation one way or
the other regarding this issue. Expectations are mental states, and there is no evidence of which I am
aware of the existence of such mental states with respect to the application of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to school segregation. It seems much more likely that most members of the public
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Perhaps Klarman can be excused for failing to understand the state
of originalist theory in 1995. I hope so, because I was equally ignorant. In
my own case, I am not sure that I can claim a defense of excusable neglect.
If I had bothered to read the key texts, I would have known about the shift
to public meaning. Since I was teaching constitutional law, the neglect is
hard to excuse. Be that as it may, there is now no excuse for the belief that
Klarman’s 1995 article demonstrated that Brown v. Board is inconsistent
with the original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause—
that belief can only be a product of epistemic negligence. Undoubtedly,
there is more to say about that topic, but the case that Brown v. Board is
inconsistent with the original public meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause has yet to be made.
At this point, let us take a step back. Our investigation of the possible
implications of the Privileges or Immunities Clause for gender equality
and segregation has revealed a surprising fact: the people who draft and
ratify a constitutional provision can themselves be surprised by its
applications! But how are surprising applications possible? Anyone who
has ever drafted a rule or policy is well familiar with the phenomenon of
unintended consequences. You write it down on paper and you think you
know what the effects will be, but then you are confronted with a case you
did not anticipate, and you come to realize that the rule that you wrote
does something you did not anticipate and don’t particularly like. If you
had it to do over again, you would write the rule differently.
The problem of unintended consequences looms larger once we take
facts into account. You write a rule for today’s facts, but tomorrow’s facts
are different. You write a rule based on your belief about the facts, but
then it turns out that you were wrong—the facts are different than you
believed them to be. And so, the very rule that you wrote has unintended
consequences—consequences that you did not even imagine when you
wrote the rule. And this is especially true when you write a rule in very
general and abstract language. Consider the text of the Privileges or
had no belief either way with respect to this question—because they simply had not thought about it
at all. Moreover, original expected application beliefs do not constitute original public meaning; they
are not binding. Original expected applications do, however, provide evidence that is relevant to
public meaning. For example, if a constitutional provision is ambiguous and one interpretation is
consistent with application expectations and the other is not, then the expectations are evidence in
favor of the interpretation with which they are consistent. But in order to make the argument, Klarman
would need to provide an account of the communicative content of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause that includes an ambiguity, demonstrate the existence of the application expectations, and then
show that this evidence supports the disambiguation that is inconsistent with the outcome in Brown.
The distinction between original expectations and original meaning was first articulated in Mark
Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 573-74 (1998); see
also Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, supra note 1, at 414.
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Immunities Clause again: “No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.” 112 Is it any wonder that such powerful language could have
unintended consequences, given changing circumstances and changing
beliefs about the facts to which the clause is to be applied?
But what if Brown v. Board cannot be justified on originalist
grounds? This question sounds simple and invites a simplistic answer: if
Brown v. Board is inconsistent with originalism, then originalism is
obviously wrong. But not so fast. Racial segregation was consistent with
the Supreme Court’s understanding of contemporary circumstances and
values for some seventy years: if living constitutionalism gave us Plessy,
what then? Again, the simple question invites a simplistic answer—living
constitutionalism is obviously wrong. Astute readers may now realize that
we are on a slippery slope, because every constitutional theory can be
shown to lead to unacceptable outcomes in some circumstances. Living
constitutionalism yields the outcomes produced by contemporary
circumstances and values—as they are understood by the Justices of the
Supreme Court at the time a particular case is decided. A living
constitutionalist court that believes in segregation will gut the Fourteenth
Amendment in the name of contemporary circumstances and values.
Indeed, Klarman’s argument about Brown v. Board actually provides a
devastating critique of living constitutionalism, even as it fails to engage
public meaning originalism. Honestly, I didn’t see that surprise coming.
These points may now seem obvious to some readers, but it will
nonetheless come as a surprise to many critics of originalism who are
inclined to say, “Originalism? Brown v. Board. Game over!” Surprisingly,
though, the game is not over. It would be more accurate to say that it has
barely begun.
D.

That’s Not Originalism! Or Is It?

At this point, some readers may be in a state of shock. I seem to be
suggesting that their preconceptions about “originalism” are wrong—not
just a little wrong, but really truly deeply wrong. Not only that, but
originalism might well have very surprising implications—some of which
might be progressive or liberal if judged by modern standards. One
possible reaction to that state of affairs is to say something like the
following:
Okay, that theory you are talking about is not so bad, but that is not what

112.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
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I mean by “originalism.” “Originalism” is “What would James
Madison do?” “Originalism” is outcomes I reject. “Originalism” is a
conservative ideology. Don’t confuse me by changing the definition of
“originalism.” I might be okay with the idea that courts should respect
the public meaning of the constitutional text. Can’t we call that
something else? Maybe “moderate living constitutionalism” or “new
textualism” or “common sense constitutionalism.” All my friends are
against originalism. I don’t want to be put in the position of explaining
my sympathies with “originalism.” I need to be able to say,
“Originalism is crazy.”

Believe me, I sympathize. I am tempted by Professor Michael Dorf’s
suggestion that originalism needs “rebranding.” 113 But in the end, I think
this move would simply be dishonest—and that it wouldn’t fool anyone
for long. The mainstream of originalism has been public meaning
originalism for more than thirty years. It is just too late to pretend
otherwise.
IV. AND THE SURPRISING JUSTIFICATIONS
If you are still with me, then you might have been struck by the
following thought:
I see that originalism is not so bad, but why should I care? For the sake
of argument, let’s assume that originalism makes sense as a theory and
that it might actually lead to good results in some cases and bad results
in others. Living constitutionalism does that too. And I don’t see how
originalism would support some of the results that matter a lot to me.
What about Obergefell 114 and the right to marriage? What about Roe v.
Wade 115 and the right to choose? The living constitutionalists on the
court supported those decisions, and the originalists opposed them. Why
shouldn’t I support the constitutional theory that enables the Supreme
Court to reach progressive (or liberal) outcomes on the issues that are
most important to me?

Indeed, many of us may be “single issue voters” when it comes to
constitutional theory—with a hot button issue that we deeply care about,
the temptation is to choose the constitutional theory that produces the
“right outcome” on that single constitutional question. Or perhaps, you

113. Michael Dorf, Advice to Conscientious Originalists: Rebrand, DORF ON LAW, Apr. 13,
2017.
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/04/advice-to-conscientious-originalists.html#more
[https://perma.cc/J63T-UGNY.
114. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, (2015).
115. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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would join a coalition of groups, each of which cares most about a single
constitutional question and then combines with the others to seek the
appointment of Justices that will advance the agenda of the coalition. Why
shouldn’t constitutional law be the outcome of action by social
movements with political agendas? 116 This question about originalism
raises important questions, but once again, the answers may come as a
surprise.
A.

Thought Experiment: “Bad” Living Constitutionalists
Let’s start with a thought experiment:
Imagine a Supreme Court that has adopted an undisguised form of living
constitutionalism: all of the Justices believe that constitutional issues
should be resolved on the basis of “constitutional values”—their
fundamental beliefs about the principles of morality that should govern
society. Now imagine that the Court consists of Justices who have values
with which you disagree. If you are a Democrat, imagine nine very
conservative Republican Justices. If you are a Republican, imagine nine
very liberal Democratic Justices. They vote their values across the
board in constitutional cases, and you disagree with those values. From
your perspective they are “bad” living constitutionalists.

Does this thought experiment make you nervous? You are pro-choice, but
the Supreme Court consists of nine pro-life Justices—they hold that state
laws permitting abortion violate the constitution because they violate the
constitutional right to life of the unborn. You support campaign finance
reform, but the Supreme Court holds that the constitution creates an
absolute right to make anonymous and unlimited donations to candidates
for elected office.
Or from the other side of the ideological divide, you believe in the
right to bear arms, but the Supreme Court holds that state laws permitting
private ownership of guns of any type violates the due process clause
because guns deprive persons of their lives without due process of law.
You believe that the decision, whether of a priest or rabbi, to perform a
marriage ceremony may properly be limited to those who are permitted to
marry under the religious doctrine of the faith of the officiant, but the
Supreme Court holds that marriage officiants (religious or secular) must
116. For examples of academic discussion of the relationship of constitutional change to social
movements, see Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 877 (2013); Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices,
and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006).
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provide their services to all comers, whatever their faith, prior marital
status, or gender-orientations.
The thought experiment might provoke the following thought:
No, I do not want the Justices with values opposed to mine to enact their
values into constitutional law. I only want living constitutionalism when
the Justices share my values. I am willing to concede that originalism is
sometimes a good idea, but only when the Court is controlled by Justice
who do not share my values—”bad” living constitutionalists.

Would this work? Can there be a stable constitutional jurisprudence that
relies on double standards—one set of rules for your friends, another set
for your enemies?
B.

The Risks of Politicization

Here is one problem with a double standard (living constitutionalism
for us, originalism for them): the other side is not likely to go along with
it in the long run. It would be irrational to comply with the rule of law
when your party controls the Court if the other side will defect when they
are in power. This is, of course, an example of what is called the
“prisoners’ dilemma” in game theory. 117 The rational response to the
prisoners’ dilemma is called “tit for tat,” but there is a problem with
retaliation. What I believe is a proportionate response, you are likely to
see as escalation. Once a downward spiral of politicization starts, it is hard
to stop.
Of course, living constitutionalism can try to disguise itself, hiding
the role of the Justices’ personal beliefs about questions of value behind a
curtain of legal mumbo jumbo. But at some point, Senators and Presidents
are going to wise up and start playing hardball. When one party controls
the Presidency and the Senate, they will select hardliners who will reliably
vote their ideology and then shove them through the process. When there
is divided government, the Senate may actually refuse to confirm Justices
nominated by a President that they oppose—simply freezing the
confirmation process until the next election. The membership of the Court
might decline from nine to eight, or even seven or six, the number that is
the bare minimum for a Supreme Court quorum. 118 What if the
membership fell to five? Things would go on, with the United States
Courts of Appeal and the State Supreme Courts functioning as the
117. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 007: The Prisoners’ Dilemma, LEGAL THEORY
LEXICON,
Apr.
13,
2017,
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/
2003/10/legal_theory_le.html [https://perma.cc/S9TY-RSZF.
118. SUP. CT. R. 4.
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effective courts of last resort on constitutional questions.
In the world of a thoroughly politicized Supreme Court, it would be
foolish for a party with control of the presidency and Congress to
nominate candidates who elevated either precedent or the constitutional
text over ideology. Given polarization in electoral politics and a
politicized Supreme Court, the opportunity to lock in a majority for
decades is just too good to pass up. The ideal nominee is a committed
ideologue under the age of 40.
But there are further moves and countermoves. If one party succeeds
in stacking the court with nine ideologues who will serve for 40 or more
years, the other party can expand the size of the Supreme Court from nine
to 19, creating a ten to nine majority for their own partisans. Of course,
why stop there? Once the other party gains a majority, then it will add
however many seats are required to flip the balance again. There is no
stopping point to this game: why not a Supreme Court of 99? Let me say
it again: once started, a downward spiral of politicization is difficult to
stop.
You may say that I am crying wolf, but isn’t it obvious that the wolf
is already at the door? Republicans blocked Merrick Garland. I’m sure
you’ve heard talk about how Democrats will respond if they regain the
Senate: no judicial nominations by a Republican President will be allowed
to reach the floor. And the idea of court-packing has already been floated.
Here is an example:
It is impossible to know when Democrats might regain total control of
the U.S. government. But assuming that American democracy survives
the high-stakes stress test of a Trump presidency, they will at some point
find themselves in the commanding position the Republicans are in now.
And when they do, they should be prepared to pass a law expanding the
number of seats on the Court from nine to 11 and to fill the two extra
seats with the most divisive, outrageous liberals in the federal
judiciary. 119

And one more:
[I]t would be very unwise for Democrats to rule anything out. They
should be careful not to blow up the power of judicial review without
good cause. But if desperate Republicans try to establish an antiDemocratic rearguard on the Supreme Court before they get swept out

119. David Faris, “How Democrats can make Republicans pay for Justice Gorsuch,” THE
WEEK, Mar. 20, 2017, http://theweek.com/articles/681352/how-democrats-make-republicans-payjustice-gorsuchrch [https://perma.cc/N4MA-VJ93].
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of office, Democrats have to leave all options on the table. 120

Pause just a moment to think about this statement. Serious consideration
is being given to “blowing up the power of judicial review.” Does anyone
believe that court packing by Democrats would be the last move? Is it
remotely plausible to think that Republicans would not respond when they
got the chance? The bottom of the downward spiral of politicization is not
a pretty place. I leave it to the reader to imagine “the parade of
horribles”—and I’m pretty sure that the parade you imagine will be
horrible indeed.
C.

The Promise of Imperfect Originalism

An originalist Supreme Court that views itself as bound by the
constitutional text lowers the stakes. The replacement of a swing justice
no longer provokes a battle royal for the constitutional future of the
republic. The original meaning of the constitutional text leads to a mixed
set of outcomes, conservative, libertarian, liberal, and progressive. As it
becomes apparent that constitutional change cannot be accomplished via
judicially imposed constitutional constructions that are constitutional
amendments in disguise, social movements and constitutional reformers
refocus their energies on the constitutional amendment process.
Originalism may not be your first choice—that might be a Supreme Court
of Platonic guardians who agree with your political ideology across the
board—but originalism can be everyone’s second choice.
We need to be realistic. Suppose that the court consists mostly of
originalist Justices who believe that they are bound by the original
meaning of the constitutional text and that they have an obligation to work
hard to discover the original meaning in hard cases. These Justices attempt
to control the temptation to engage in motivated reasoning. But they are
not perfect. The world of perfect judicial neutrality is almost surely “pie
in the sky.” 121 Some slippage is probably inevitable. There undoubtedly
would be cases where the Justices’ values would influence their
conclusions about original meaning. But when we compare imperfect
120. Scott Lemieux, Democrats: Prepare to Pack the Supreme Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
May, 10, 2018, https://newrepublic.com/article/148358/democrats-prepare-pack-supreme-court
[https://perma.cc/F2NX-ZJ7E].
121. The phrase is from Joe Hill:
You will eat, bye and bye,
In that glorious land above the sky;
Work and pray, live on hay,
You’ll get pie in the sky when you die.
JOE HILL, THE PREACHER AND THE SLAVE (1911).
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originalism with living constitutionalist approaches that require the judges
to rely on their own values when deciding constitutional cases, the result
of the comparison is obvious. Imperfect originalism is better than a
downward spiral of politicization that ends in the destruction of the rule
of law.
One more thing: my impression is that some critics of originalist
constitutional theory equate originalism as a theory with the decisions of
Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas—and in the near
future this equation might extend to Justice Gorsuch. This identification
of originalism with specific decisions by three Justices is problematic at
many levels, starting with the fact that judges on a multimember collegial
court dominated by living constitutionalists (both liberal and
conservative) cannot as a practical matter write originalist opinions in
every constitutional case. In many constitutional cases, none of the briefs
engage in originalist analysis. On many constitutional issues, the academy
has yet to provide input in the form of high-quality originalist scholarship
informed by contemporary originalist thinking on both theory and
methodology. When I speak of the promise of imperfect originalism, I do
not mean to suggest that this promise has already been realized or that
Antonin Scalia was a perfect paragon of originalist virtue.
D.

But Wait, There’s More

The risk of politicization is one justification for originalism, but there
are others. 122 Originalism is consistent with the rule of law values—
stability, consistency, certainty, publicity, and uniformity of law. Living
constitutionalism tends to undermine those values, especially in a nation
closely divided along ideological lines where control of the presidency
and the Senate can flip from election to election. If the Supreme Court is
evenly divided, with four reliable liberals and four conservatives, then the
replacement of the swing justice can lead to unpredictable changes in
constitutional law. And any flip-flopping of the swing Justice will be
especially damaging to the stability of the law. Moreover, a closely
divided court is likely to produce compromise opinions with inconsistent
reasoning—making it difficult for even excellent lawyers to say what the
law actually is at any given point in time.
Another line of argument for originalism focuses on legitimacy.
Democratic legitimacy is a matter of degree, not an on or off switch.
Deciding constitutional questions on the basis of the original meaning of

122.

The case for originalism is examined in Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 1.
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the text is not perfect: some parts of the constitution are very old and were
adopted by democratic processes that excluded women, slaves, and others.
But giving the authority to amend the Constitution to a majority vote of
five members of a committee of nine individuals who serve life terms is
even much worse—and by the way, Supreme Court Justices are hardly
representative of America today. For one thing, this group only includes
graduates of the Harvard and Yale Law Schools; for another, it fails to
include members of dozens of important groups. If the right to vote were
limited to citizens who resemble the Justices on the Supreme Court, we
would not have a democracy in any meaningful sense of that concept.
Moreover, giving judges the authority to make the law is inconsistent
with widely shared views about their legitimate judicial role: that is why
no nominee for a seat on the Supreme Court will admit that they believe
they will have the authority to override the original meaning of the
constitutional text. Even a committed living constitutionalist will be likely
to say something like, “We are all originalists now.” 123 Academics may
write articles that openly advocate the view that the Supreme Court is not
bound by the constitutional text, 124 but that view is inconsistent with any
mainstream understanding of the legitimate function of judges. This leads
to another problem with living constitutionalism. Because living
constitutionalist judges want to preserve their own legitimacy, they are
likely to disguise the true reasons for their decisions. Originalism leads to
transparency, but living constitutionalism tends to produce the opposite—
a jurisprudence of concealment and obfuscation.
Here is one final thought experiment:
In times of national crisis, a popular President induces the nation to
convene a Constitutional Convention. He circumvents the Article V
process and instead has Congress enact ordinary legislation giving him
the power to nominate the members of the convention, subject to Senate
confirmation. The House and Senate quickly pass the legislation. To
ensure swift action, the Convention has only nine representatives and its
amendments to the constitution become law immediately, without
ratification by the States.
Nine representatives to the Convention are nominated and confirmed.
Five come from the President’s party, and four are from the opposition
123. See David Ingram, On Day 2, Kagan Tries to Appease Republicans, NAT’L. LAW JOURNAL,
June 30, 2010, https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202463159121/On-Day-2-KaganTries-to-Appease-Republicans/ [ https://perma.cc/4LND-BLQU] (“Sometimes they laid down very
specific rules. Sometimes they laid down broad principles. Either way, we apply what they tried to do
False In that way, we are all originalists.”).
124. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010);
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party. They all have graduated from Harvard or Yale Law School. There
are five Roman Catholics, three Jews, one Protestant, one Latina, and
one African American. Forty-five of the states are unrepresented at the
convention. There are no Asians, no Native Americans, no one from the
South or border states, and no one from the Pacific Northwest, Alaska,
or Hawaii. There is no one who has ever held a job other than lawyer,
judge, or law professor.
The assumption was that the Convention would end after proposing
amendments, but the members of the Convention are unable to agree on
the actual text of amendments. They seem to be serving for life terms.
Instead of amendments, they issue decrees that resolve particular
constitutional issues. Sometimes their decrees are very narrow: they
actually decide a disputed presidential election but propose no rules to
govern future elections. Sometimes their decrees are very broad: they
issue rules for police interrogations that spell out the words that must
be said before questioning begins. They turn out to be flip-floppers. One
year they create a right to abortion, but a few years later they decree
that reasonable restrictions on abortion are permissible. States can
criminalize flag burning one year, but then the Convention changes its
mind. Sometimes, they cannot even agree on the wording of the decree
and two or three groups issue inconsistent decrees. Critics howl, but the
President directs all the Departments of the national government to
comply with the decrees of the perpetual Constitutional Convention.

Does this way of deciding constitutional issues comply with the rule of
law? Could a nine-person perpetual constitutional convention claim
democratic legitimacy? Would you say that this convention has the
breadth of experience and background to represent the American people
as a whole? And a final question: how different is a living constitutionalist
Supreme Court from the perpetual Constitutional Convention?
Originalism is imperfect. Living constitutionalism is imperfect as
well. And I am sure that many opponents of originalism will object on the
grounds that the version of living constitutionalism that I have been
discussing is a caricature. Academics will complain that I have not
discussed the sophisticated versions of living constitutionalism that have
been developed by law professors. These include theories called
“common law constitutionalism,” 125 “constitutional pluralism,” 126 and
“moral readings.” 127 The trick that such theories seek to perform is to give
125. Id.; David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 57 (2015).
126. Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1753, 1753
(1994).
127. JAMES FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS

276

CONLAWNOW

[9:235

the Supreme Court the power to override the original meaning of the
constitutional text while simultaneously keeping the Court within the
bounds of the rule of law and democratic legitimacy. This feat of
legerdemain is not easy to perform. I am skeptical of the idea that telling
the Court to engage in moral readings of the constitutional text will
provide meaningful constraint. 128 I am dubious about the ability of the
common law method to provide substantial restrictions on the policy
views of the Justices. 129 I am suspicious of the claim that judges who
consider text, history, structure, precedent, constitutional values, and
pragmatic factors will not throw their own ideology into the mix of
constitutional methods. 130 I am not convinced that living constitutionalism

AGAINST ORIGINALISMS (2015); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); see also RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996);
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
128. Dworkin clearly states that he believes that the moral reading of the constitution can
override the constitutional text:
“[Laurence’s Tribes statement of the constraining role of the constitutional text] is a
stronger statement of textual fidelity than I [Dworkin] would myself endorse, because, as
I said, precedent and practice over time can, in principle, supersede even so basic a piece
of interpretive data as the Constitution’s text when no way of reconciling them all in an
overall constructive interpretation can be found.”
Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1249, 1259–60 (1997). Dworkin’s moral readings approach allows judges to adopt the
“constructive interpretation” of the constitutional text that makes constitution law “the best that it can
be”—and this method requires judges to rely on their moral beliefs. The full argument that Dworkin’s
complex and shifting approach is unconstrained cannot be made on this occasion. See generally
Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 1.
129. Defenders of common law constitutionalism might argue that precedent and the doctrine
of stare decisis provide sufficient constraint, but Strauss’s understanding of the force of precedent
makes it clear that these constraints are week:
[P]rovisions of the text of the Constitution are, to a first approximation, treated in more or
less the same way as precedents in a common law system. The effect of constitutional
provisions is not fixed at their adoption—or, for that matter, at any other time. Instead,
like precedents, provisions are expanded, limited, qualified, reconceived, relegated to the
background, or all-but-ignored, depending on what comes afterward—on subsequent
decisions and on judgments about the direction in which the law should develop.
David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 57
(2015); Strauss offers no account of the constraining force of precedent in this article. He makes no
mention of the doctrine of stare decisis. But as the quoted passage demonstrates, Strauss does make
it clear that precedents can be “expanded, limited, qualified, reconceived, relegated to the background,
or all-but-ignored, depending . . . on judgments about the direction in which the law should develop.”
Id. (emphasis added).
130. Constitutional pluralism allows judges to consider a variety of factors, including text,
history, structure, workability, and constitutional values (the list varies). Because pluralism denies
that there is any hierarchy among the factors, decisions using this method can be justified as long as
at least one of the factors supports that outcome. If constitutional values are on this list and because
the identify, force, and priority of constitutional values will inevitably be influenced by the moral and
political views of the judge, this approach does not provide meaningful constraint.
AND
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can be squared with the rule of law and democratic legitimacy, but I am
prepared to be surprised. 131
V. CONCLUSION: AN OPEN MIND
Contemporary originalists focus on the public meaning of the
constitutional text—and not on the policy preferences of the framers. An
originalist jurisprudence would lead to a mix of outcomes—conservative,
liberal, progressive, and libertarian—if the original meaning of the
constitution were fully implemented. The justifications for originalism
can appeal to a wide range of the political spectrum: most Americans
believe that the rule of law and democratic legitimacy are important
political values. Very few Americans would support a thoroughly
politicized Supreme Court.
Originalism! It is a surprising theory. It has surprising implications.
And it is supported by surprising justifications. My aim in this Article and
in the Regula Lecture upon which it is based is not to persuade you to
become an originalist! Our views about originalism are deeply entrenched
and difficult to dislodge. My own conversion to originalism from living
constitutionalism began in the nineties and was not complete until ten
years later. Conversions take time. I do hope that I surprised you. And if
you are surprised, then, just maybe, you will approach originalism with
curiosity and an open mind.

131. For more on the comparison between public meaning originalism and various forms of
living constitutionalism, see Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 1.

